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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 1095, 
AFL-CIO, ERIE COUNTY BLUE 
COLLAR EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-18864 
COUNTY OF ERIE (ERIE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE), 
Respondent. 
) JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MICHAEL CONNORS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME Council 66, Local 1095, 
AFL-CIO, Erie County Blue Collar Employees Union (AFSCME) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the County of Erie (Erie 
Community College) (County or College) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted the provision of security 
services at the Advanced Training Center (ATC), an off-campus facility operated by the 
County. 
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The ALJ dismissed the charge because AFSCME did not establish its exclusivity 
over the in-issue work. AFSCME argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in not 
finding that a "discernible boundary"1 existed around the in-issue work, by finding that 
AFSCME had waived its exclusivity, and by failing to address the claim thatthe County 
continued to control the in-issue work. The County supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The facts are few and largely undisputed. The County began offering classes 
through the College in the fall of 1995 at the ATC, an off-campus location. In June 
1995, the County advised the College's head of security that it would be providing 
) evening security and escort services at the ATC facility starting in September 1995. 
For approximately one month from September 1995 to October 1995, security officers, 
employed by the County at the College and in the unit represented by AFSCME, 
provided a security presence at the ATC facility from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, and on weekends, as needed. From October 1995 to April 13, 1996, 
the same services were provided by a private company, Pro Guard, whose employees 
also provide security services at the ATC facility from 7:30 a.m to 5:00 p.m., Monday 
through Friday. On April 13, 1996, the 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. weekday security 
services were reassigned to the security officers represented by AFSCME until January 
1A "discernible boundary" is simply a particularized definition of unit work within 
which a union may have exclusivity over work it would otherwise not have established 
and maintained. 
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1997, when Pro Guard was once again assigned to provide security from 5:00 p.m. to 
11:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, at the ATC facility. 
The initial question to be answered in a case alleging a unilateral transfer of unit 
work from a charging party's bargaining unit is whether the work has been performed 
exclusively by employees in thatunit.2 As found by the ALJ, the second shiftsecurity at _ 
the ATC facility was performed in its first year and a half by both the security personnel 
represented by AFSCME and the employees of Pro Guard. That unit employees had 
the assignment initially, for only a month, does not establish AFSCME's exclusivity.3 
The employees of Pro Guard performed the second shift security duties for the next 
seven months. AFSCME's unit employees were then reassigned to provide security 
) from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. at the ATC facility for the next seven months. Thereafter, 
Pro Guard employees were again retained to do that work from January 1997 to the 
present. Given this assignment and reassignment of the second shift security duties at 
ATC to both unit and nonunit employees, under no possible analysis of the facts of this 
case could it be found that AFSCME had ever obtained exclusivity over the work in-
issue.4 As the work was not exclusive bargaining unit work, the County committed no 
2Niaqara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
3See City of Rochester. 21 PERB ^3040 (1988), confd, 155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 
PERB H7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
4AFSCME asserts in its exceptions that it has performed exclusively all off-
campus security work for the County and, therefore, the first assignment of the second 
) shift security work at the ATC facility to Pro Guard cannot be seen as a waiver of 
AFSCME's exclusivity. There is no record evidence to support AFSCME's assertion. 
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violation when it retained Pro Guard to provide second shift security duties at the ATC 
facility in January 1997. 
AFSCME appears to argue in its brief that the work was reassigned to its unit 
employees in April 1996 because negotiations between the County and AFSCME 
resulted in an agreement that the second shift security work would be returned to the 
unit. Therefore, AFSCME asserts, the assignment of the second shift security to Pro 
Guard in October 1995 cannot be seen as a waiver by AFSCME of exclusivity over that 
unit work. There is, however, no record evidence that the decision of the County was 
based upon negotiations with AFSCME and we, therefore, do not reach it. 
Based on the foregoing, AFSCME's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UTICA PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 32, IAFF, 
AFL-CIO-CLC, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18370 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (MARY M. ROACH of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Utica Professional Fire 
Fighters Association, Local 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC (Association) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The Association's charge alleges that the City of 
Utica (City) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
requiring unit fire fighters to submit to physical examinations under conditions fixed 
unilaterally by the City to determine their fitness to use respirators safely. After a 
hearing, the ALJ deferred consideration of the issues raised by the charge to the 
parties' uninvoked contractual grievance arbitration procedure. In deferring the charge, 
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the ALJ held that the parties' 1992-96 collective bargaining agreement remained in 
effect under a continuation clause contained in that agreement.1 The ALJ then held 
that the scope of the parties' contractual grievance procedure, which defines a 
grievance as "any controversy, dispute or difference between the parties arising out of 
[the]_working_ conditions affecting the employee relations of any individual employeeor _ 
the Association . . .", gave the Association and its unit employees a reasonably 
arguable contract right "to be free from the unilateral implementation of the at-issue 
physical examination procedures . . . ." 
The Association argues that the ALJ's deferral of this charge was contrary to law 
and policy and should be reversed and remanded for decision. In response, the City 
argues that the ALJ did not err in deferring this charge. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we reverse 
the ALJ's decision. 
It is unclear whether the ALJ's decision reflects a jurisdictional deferral, a merits 
deferral or both because the ALJ cited cases on each of these two different types of 
deferral.2 In this case, however, it is not necessary for us to identify the type of deferral 
1
 Neither party takes exception to the ALJ's decision in this respect. 
2ln a jurisdictional deferral case, we are deferring an exercise of our jurisdiction 
to determine whether or not we actually have jurisdiction over a particular charge to 
permit a contract interpretation to be made by a court, an arbitrator or other appropriate 
body. A merits deferral presupposes the existence of our jurisdiction over a charge, 
usually because the parties' contract.has expired. In a merits deferral circumstance, 
we are deferring a decision on the merits of a charge within our jurisdiction to allow for 
) a disposition on the contract questions raised by that charge in another binding, neutral 
forum, usually grievance arbitration. 
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the ALJ intended because both require that there be some contractual provision, 
whether current or expired, which can reasonably be argued to be a source of right to 
the Association with respect to the subject matter of its charge. There can be no 
allegation of contract violation triggering the jurisdictional limitations in §205.5(d) of the 
Actand the corresponding jurisdictional deferral policies, and nothing to grieve for 
purposes of a merits deferral, unless there is something in the parties' contract which 
gives the Association a reasonably arguable source of contractual right with respect to 
the matter in issue under this charge. 
The ALJ used the definition of a grievance in these parties' agreement as the 
arguable source of an Association right to have the employees it represents be free 
from the City's unilateral imposition of the procedures for the conduct of the respirator 
physicals and the effects of those physicals. As best we can determine, the ALJ read 
the right to grieve "working conditions" as the arguable equivalent of a contractual past 
practice clause or a maintenance of benefits provision,3 which was arguably violated 
because the City previously had not conducted respirator fitness testing. 
A grievance procedure, however broad its scope, is basically a procedural 
mechanism which affords the parties to the agreement a forum for the investigation, 
settlement and adjudication of claimed contract rights. The availability of a forum in 
which to test those alleged contract rights does not necessarily mean, however, that the 
forum is itself the source of any substantive rights. 
3The parties' agreement does not contain these clauses. 
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In this case, a right to grieve "working conditions" is not reasonably construed to 
mean that the Association and its unit employees enjoy any contractual rights regarding 
the conditions under which respirator fitness physicals are conducted or the effects of 
those physicals. The quoted phrase within these parties' definition of a grievance is 
- not, in our opinion, reasonably read to embrace respirator fitness physicals The words 
"working conditions" ordinarily mean the conditions under which work is actually 
performed, such that it might reasonably relate, for example, to whether or.not an 
employee is to wear a respirator on the job. We cannot reasonably construe a general 
right to grieve "working conditions" to bestow upon the Association or the employees it 
represents the specific contractual right to have employees be free from having to be 
examined under fixed conditions to determine whether they are able to wear a 
respirator safely if and when they do actually work at tasks requiring the wearing of a 
respirator. 
The City suggests in its brief that Article III of the parties' contract pertaining to 
unit employees' sick leave rights is also a basis for deferral of this charge. That section 
of the contract, not relied upon by the ALJ, is not a source of any right to the 
Association regarding the City's imposition of the physical examination, the procedures 
attendant to that examination, or the effects occasioned thereby. Therefore, that 
section of the contract provides no basis for either a jurisdictional or merits deferral of 
this charge. 
In holding that the ALJ's deferral of this charge, whether jurisdictional^ or merits 
based, was inappropriate, we do not suggest any dissatisfaction with the reasons 
underlying those deferral policies as developed over many years. The existence of a 
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contractual right triggering either type of deferral need not be explicit, but it must be at 
least reasonably arguable. We simply believe that in this case the ALJ converted 
deferral policies resting on "reasonably arguable" violations of the terms of current or 
expired collective bargaining agreements into policies which permit and require a 
deferral whenever.an. improper practice charge alleges a contract breach which is 
"remotely possible". The ALJ's decision drains our basic standard for deferral of any 
real meaning and creates the unacceptable situation where almost no refusal to 
negotiate charge resting on unilateral action with respect to an allegedly mandatory 
subject of negotiation would be within our power or discretion to entertain. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the ALJ for such further processing as is appropriate. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 589, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIREFIGHTERS, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19268 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Respondent. 
VLADECK, WALDMAN, ELIAS & ENGELHARD, P.C. (RICHARD S. 
CORENTHAL and MAUREEN M. STAMPP of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY (ALISON C. FAIRBANKS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions filed, respectively, by 
Local 589, International Association of Firefighters (Association) and the City of 
Newburgh (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the 
Association's charge against the City. The Association alleges in this charge that the 
City violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
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unilaterally imposed new rules and procedures relating to an employee's eligibility for 
benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) §207-a.1 
The ALJ deferred the consideration of the merits of this charge to the parties' 
uninvoked contractual grievance arbitration procedure. 
The Association argues that the ALJ erred in deferring this charge because the 
parties specifically agreed in §21 of their negotiated GML §207-a procedures that any 
disputes involving those procedures "shall not be subject to review under the 
contractual grievance arbitration procedure, but shall be subject to review only by 
judicial proceeding." Therefore, according to the Association, there is no grievance 
procedure to which to defer this charge. The City agrees that the ALJ should not have 
conditionally dismissed this charge pursuant to our deferral policy. It argues, however, • 
that the ALJ should have unconditionally dismissed this charge precisely because the 
parties have agreed that disputes concerning GML §207-a issues are to be resolved 
only through judicial proceedings. According to the City, the Association waived any 
right to file an improper practice charge involving a dispute about GML §207-a issues 
by agreeing to §21. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we dismiss the Association's charge 
because the Association has clearly waived any right to file improper practice charges 
of this type regarding GML §207-a disputes. In dismissing this charge, we reverse that 
1The City is now requiring an employee to assist with the completion of a detailed 
physician's report containing specific information about an employee's injury, course of 
treatment, medical progress and ability to work. An employee's failure or refusal to 
assist with the completion of the report is made grounds for termination or denial of 
GML §207-a benefits. 
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part of a decision in an earlier case involving these same parties in which the prior 
Board held to the contrary regarding waiver.2 Accordingly, we do not decide whether 
the ALJ was correct in deferring a consideration of the merits of this charge. 
In the earlier case, the City, as here, was alleged to have imposed unilaterally a 
new rule relating to and affecting unit employees' eligibility for GML §207-a benefits. 
The prior Board found that the parties had negotiated a comprehensive system for the 
resolution of disputes involving GML §207-a issues, including §21, which provides as 
follows: 
Any claim of violation, misapplication or misinterpretation of the terms of 
this procedure shall not be subject to review under the contractual 
grievance arbitration procedure, but shall be subject to review only by 
judicial proceeding. 
The prior Board held that §21 did not establish a knowing, clear and unmistakable 
waiver of the Association's right to file an improper practice charge centered upon 
alleged unilateral changes in GML §207-a rules or procedures relating to or affecting a 
unit employee's eligibility for GML §207-a benefits. 
We agree with the prior Board's conclusion that a union's right to access this 
agency with improper practice charges of the type here in issue can be waived and that 
the waiver must be knowing and clear if it is to be given effect. We disagree only with 
the prior Board's conclusion that §21 is not a plain and clear waiver. 
In our view, the prior Board's interpretation of §21 does not give meaning and 
effect to the language limiting review of any disputes involving GML §207-a to judicial 
proceeding only. That language is not ambiguous in any respect. Therefore, resort to 
2CityofNewburgh. 30 PERB 1J3027 (1997). 
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parol evidence to vary the plain meaning of that language should not have been 
admitted and should not have been considered in assessing the intent of §21.3 In 
effect, the testimony relied upon by the Board in the earlier case created an ambiguity 
out of language which is otherwise clear on its face. 
Even wereweto consider the parol evidence relied upon by the prior Board in 
holding that §21 was not a waiver of the Association's right to bring its improper practice 
charge, we hold that the testimony was itself ambiguous and of a character insufficient 
to establish that the parties did not really intend what the words of their 
"comprehensive" agreement plainly convey. An entitlement to use "only" a judicial 
proceeding to resolve "any claim" involving a dispute about GML §207-a issues 
necessarily means redress through that one type of proceeding to the exclusion of all 
others. Therefore, it is inconsequential that §21 does not refer specifically to improper 
practice charges. 
Although we are reluctant to have a second improper practice charge become 
the mechanism for a reversal of a recent Board determination on another charge, we 
are convinced that reversal of the prior decision is the only appropriate course because 
we consider the prior decision to be incorrect. To allow this charge to continue to a 
disposition on the merits by the ALJ would be a disservice to both of these parties in 
3Milonasv. PERBT 225 A.D.2d 57, 29 PERB 1J7017 (3d Dep't 1996), motions for 
leave to appeal deniedr 89 N.Y.2d 811, 30 PERB 1J7003 (1997). As the Court in 
Milonas held that parol evidence was not properly considered in that case, it is likewise 
not properly considered in this case because the language in §21 of the parties' GML 
§207-a procedures is far clearer than the language in the page rate agreement in issue 
in Milonas. 
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these circumstances. An unconditional dismissal of the charge will allow the 
Association to pursue promptly such appeal as it considers appropriate. 
For the reasons set forth above, the charge in this matter is ordered dismissed. 
-5 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
iel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN E. CREEDON POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF UTICA, NEW YORK, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19283 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (JAMES W. ROEMER, JR. and 
JEFFREY S. HARTNETT of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Utica (City) to a decision 
by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director) on a charge filed against the City by the John E. Creedon Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. of Utica, New York (PBA). As relevant to the exceptions,1 the PBA 
alleges that the City violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by submitting a nonmandatory subject of negotiation to compulsory interest 
1The City did not file any exceptions to the Assistant Director's holding that the 
other of its proposals at issue under this charge is also a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
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arbitration. The City proposes to modify language in the parties' expired agreement 
under which disciplinary charges are heard, at the employee's option, in either Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §75 or binding arbitration proceedings. The City proposes to 
eliminate the option of a CSL §75 hearing. Under the City's proposal, the City would be 
privileged to implement a proposed disciplm 
against an employee subject to review by a neutral arbitrator under a disciplinary 
grievance. 
The Assistant Director held the City's demand nonmandatory, even though 
disciplinary procedures by their subject nature are terms and conditions of employment, 
because under then existing case law an employer could not compel a union to 
negotiate a waiver or modification of any statutory right held by an employee. 
In City of Cohoes (hereafter Cohoes),2 issued on July 23, 1998, after the 
Assistant Director issued his decision in this case, we reversed the case law relied upon 
by the Assistant Director. We held in Cohoes that proposed waivers or modifications of 
employees' statutory rights are mandatorily negotiable if the demand embraces a term 
and condition of employment, unless the particular waiver or modification proposed is 
against public policy or the bargaining has been foreclosed or the union's bargaining 
obligation has been lifted pursuant to a plain and clear expression of legislative intent. 
231 PERB H3020(1998). 
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We cannot ascertain any public policy prohibiting the substitution of binding 
arbitration before a neutral third party for the procedures under CSL §75.3 Similarly, we 
find no plain and clear expression of legislative intent in the CSL or any other statute to 
either prohibit negotiation about arbitration for the resolution of employee disciplinary 
charges or to exempt eitherparty_to_a bargaining rejatjon 
this term and condition of employment.4 
For the reasons set forth above, City proposal 22 is mandatorily negotiable. The 
Assistant Director's decision to the contrary is reversed to that extent. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed as to the allegations concerning City proposal 22. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Miclia0l)R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
3American Broadcasting Cos. v. Roberts, 61 N.Y.2d 244 (1984). Plummerv. 
Klepak, 48 N.Y.2d 486, 13 PERB 1J7527 (1979); Antinore v. State of New YorkT 40 
N.Y.2d 921, 9 PERB 117528 (1976), affg,49 A.D.2d 6, 8 PERB 1J7513 (4th Dep't 1975); 
Johnson v. Jorling, 150 A.D.2d 896, 22 PERB 1J7532 (3d Dep't 1989); Elliott v. Arlington 
Cent. Son. Dist., 143 A.D.2d 662, 22 PERB 1J7506 (2d Dep't 1988); Harris v. Nassau 
County Dep't of Social Servs., 134 A.D.2d 499, 21 PERB ^7509 (2d Dep't 1987). 
4Auburn Police Local 195 v. PERB, 91 Misc.2d 909, 10 PERB 1J7016 (Sup. Ct. 
Alb. Co. 1977), affd, 62A.D.2d 12, 11 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dep't 1978), a f f i t 46 N.Y.2d 
1034, 12 PERB lf7006 (1979), construing CSL §76(4). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
REBECAARMATAS, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18859 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
REBECA ARMATAS, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL H. JANIS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (THOMAS A. 
LIESE of counsel), for Employer. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Rebeca Armatas to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her charge that the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
) (Act) when it failed to file a grievance on her behalf with regard to her alleged wrongful 
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discharge from employment and when it failed to respond to her subsequent requests 
for information and assistance. Armatas' former employer, the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York (District), was made a statutory party 
pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
A pre-hearing conference was held in this case, after which itwas scheduled for 
hearing.1 The notices of hearing contain statements that warn parties that failure to 
appear at a scheduled hearing might constitute ground for the dismissal of the absent 
party's pleading. After the conference, but prior to the scheduled date of the hearing, 
Armatas requested the ALJ to issue subpoenas compelling the appearance of nine 
witnesses to testify at the hearing.2 The ALJ issued one subpoena for a UFT 
representative and denied the request as to the other eight individuals. By letter dated 
October 17, 1997, Armatas objected to the ALJ's denial of the subpoenas as to these 
eight individuals and advised "[i]f the PERB changes its position regarding the 
subpoenas, we'll be happy to attend the hearing." 
The UFT and the District appeared at the hearing on October 23, but neither 
Armatas nor any representative for her appeared. Both UFT and the District moved for 
dismissal of the charge for failure to prosecute based upon Armatas' failure to appear 
at the hearing. The ALJ thereafter afforded Armatas an opportunity to respond to the 
JThe hearing was originally scheduled for August 7, 1997, but was rescheduled 
to October 23, 1997, at Armatas' request. 
2Armatas requested subpoenas for the President of UFT, the Director of School 
Personnel of School District 9, the Assistant Principal of the school to which Armatas 
was assigned prior to her termination, five UFT representatives, and the teacher, 
unnamed, who filled Armatas' vacant position. 
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motion in writing. By letter dated November 2, 1997, Armatas confirmed that she would 
not appear at any PERB hearing because the ALJ had denied her request for 
subpoenas. The ALJ then dismissed the charge. 
In her exceptions, Armatas argues that the ALJ erred in refusing to issue eight of 
the nine ...subpoenas, she requested. The UFTsupports ihe ALJ's decision. The District 
did not file any response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The issue before us here is not whether the ALJ's ruling on the subpoena 
requests was correct, only whether dismissal of the charge for failure to prosecute was 
an abuse of discretion. We conclude that it was not. 
Armatas clearly refused and continues to refuse to appear at a hearing on her 
charge unless the ALJ issues all nine of the requested subpoenas. Section 204.7(b) of 
our Rules of Procedure provides that "[t]he failure of a party to appear at the hearing 
may, in the discretion of the designated administrative law judge, constitute ground for 
dismissal of the absent party's pleading." Armatas was three times advised of this 
possibility and yet she refused to attend the scheduled hearing unless the subpoenas 
she requested were issued. A charging party who takes it upon himself or herself to 
refuse to participate in a PERB proceeding because of an adverse ruling does so at his 
or her peril because such a refusal constitutes a failure to prosecute the charge and 
Board - U-18859 -4 
may result in the dismissal of the charge.3 Armatas could, and should, have appeared 
at the hearing, presented her case, taken the opportunity to cross-examine any UFT or 
District witnesses and appealed the ALJ's ruling on the subpoena request if she was 
aggrieved by the ALJ's decision. By failing to appear, Armatas lost the opportunity to 
have her charge heard and to appeal from anyprocedural rulingsmade before or at the 
hearing. 
Based on the foregoing, Armatas' exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision 
is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Micha&hR. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
) 
3See City of Rye. 13 PERB1J3039, confd sub nom. Banahan v. PERB. 13 PERB 
117012 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1980). See also Board of Educ.of the City Sch. Dist. of 
the City of New York. 15 PERB 1)3042 (1982). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AUBURN ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18346 
AUBURN ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PAUL J. DERKASCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Auburn Administrators 
Association (Association) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) dismissing its charge that the 
Auburn Enlarged City School District (District) violated §209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally assigned supervision 
of after-school athletic events to assistant principals at the high school.1 
The Assistant Director found that attendance at after-school athletic events was 
an inherent part of the overall responsibilities and duties of assistant principals at the 
high school and dismissed the charge. The Association argues in its exceptions that 
1The alleged violation of §209-a.1 (e) of the Act was withdrawn by the 
Association in its post-hearing brief to the Assistant Director. 
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the decision is factually and legally incorrect and is not supported by the record.2 The 
District filed cross-exceptions, arguing that the Assistant Director erred in dismissing 
the District's jurisdictional defense, but that in all other respects the decision should be 
affirmed. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director. 
The District employs three assistant principals in the high school. The parties' 
1992-1996 collective bargaining agreement requires administrators to work a minimum 
of eight hours per day. The assistant principals' regular workday runs from 7:30 a.m. to 
3:30 p.m. per day, although most days they work until 4:30 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.3 The 
current job description for the assistant principals provides: 
As directed by the building on [sic] principal, he/she shall 
supervise the operations of student services as they pertain 
to high school such as: 
c. Attendance at most major student events, and as 
assigned by the high school principal 
d. Others, as designated by the high school principal. 
In September 1996, Raymond Savareze, the interim high school principal, met 
with the three assistant principals and told them that they would now be required to 
attend after-school athletic events. Savareze acknowledged that their required 
2The Assistant Director dismissed the alleged violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
No exceptions have been taken to this determination. 
) 3The high school students are dismissed at 2:20 p.m. and the teachers' 
contractual workday ends at 2:55 p.m. 
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attendance was contrary to past practice.4 Thereafter, Savareze confirmed the 
assignment in writing, assigning each of the assistant principals to a rotating schedule 
of eight athletic events during a two-week period. 
We will first dispose of the jurisdictional argument raised in the District's cross-
exceptions. The District points to contractual language which sets the assistant -
principals' workday at a minimum of eight hours as depriving PERB of jurisdiction over 
the instant charge. The charge does not allege an improper extension of the workday, 
but the assignment of additional duties outside the scope of the assistant principals' job 
description. As the contract does not provide a reasonably arguable source of right in 
relevant respect to the Association, we have jurisdiction over this charge. 
The Association argues that supervision of after-school athletic events had 
never before been required of the assistant high school principals and that the District's 
directive unilaterally changed this practice. There is no dispute that attendance at 
after-school athletic events is a new duty assigned by the District for the first time in 
September 1996. What must be resolved is whether the District's requirement of 
attendance by the assistant principals at after-school athletic events adds duties 
beyond the essential character, and its related incidental tasks, of their jobs,5 a change 
in a mandatory subject of negotiations. The Assistant Director found that it did not, 
based upon the job description for the assistant principals and the record testimony. 
4The assistant principals had not been required to attend after-school athletic 
events. Prior to September 1996, the athletic director had assigned other staff to 
supervise these events, for which they received a stipend. 
5Waverlv Cent. Sch. Dist.,10 PERB 1J3103 (1977). 
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As part of the assistant principals' function of supervising student services, their 
job description provides that the assistant principals will attend "most major school 
events" and other events "as assigned by the high school principal" and will perform 
other related duties "as designated by the high school principal". Two of the major 
responsibilities ofI the assistant principals are to maintain student discipIine.andto_ 
schedule, coordinate and attend events at the high school. Diane Dolcemascolo, one 
of the assistant principals, testified that she had been required to attend after-school 
student dances, to supervise the teachers who were supervising the students. The 
record establishes that attendance at after-school athletic events at the high school is 
an inherent part of the assistant principals' duties and, at the very least, is incidental to 
their overall duties and responsibilities.6 Accordingly, the District's assignment of 
assistant principals at the high school to attend after-school athletic events is not 
violative of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. The record does not establish that the after-school 
duty assignment increased the hours the assistant principals had actually been 
working, as the record shows that they often worked until 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. The 
ccntract did not define the assistant principals' maximum hours of work; it set forth their 
minimum hours, subject to increase when caused by the assignment of after-school 
activities consistent with their position. As the duties in issue were properly assigned, 
no violation lies in the derivative increase in hours worked when on after-school 
assignment, even if the charge were read to include an allegation that hours of work 
had been increased unilaterally. 
6Sacketts Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist., 13 PERB fl3058 (1980). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are denied and the 
Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the East Ramapo Central School 
District (District) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) holding, upon a charge filed by the East 
Ramapo School Nurses Association, NEA/NY (Association), that the District violated 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by conditioning 
contract negotiations with the Association upon a settlement of negotiations with its 
teachers, who are represented in a different negotiating unit.1 
1The Assistant Director dismissed the allegations that the District had refused to 
negotiate noneconomic issues until economic issues were settled and had refused to 
modify any of its proposals. No exceptions were taken to these aspects of the 
Assistant Director's decision. 
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A hearing was held at which both parties were present and represented. The 
Association called three witnesses and then rested. The District then informed the 
Assistant Director that its only witness, Sol Davis, who had been its chief spokesperson 
at negotiations, was too ill to testify. The hearing was, therefore, adjourned and the 
District wasafforded the opportunity Jo consider alternate means Joobtain Davis' 
testimony. Thereafter, the District rested without going forward.2 Both parties filed 
legal briefs. 
Based on the record evidence, the Assistant Director determined that the District 
had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by stating to the Association that it would not reach 
agreement with the Association unless and until it concluded contract negotiations with 
the union representing its teachers and then conducting negotiations with the 
Association on that basis . 
The District excepts to the Assistant Director's decision, arguing that he 
incorrectly relied on the testimony of one Association witness that was refuted by the 
testimony of another Association witness. The Association supports the decision of the 
Assistant Director. 
Based upon our consideration of the parties' arguments and our review of the 
record, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
On May 24, 1995, the District and the Association commenced negotiations for a 
contract to succeed the one expiring on June 30, 1995. The parties met throughout 
1995, and on January 22, 1996, at the conclusion of the negotiating session, both sides 
2Davis' illness prevented his testimony at any adjourned date. 
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agreed that negotiations were at an impasse. On May 5, 1996, the parties met with a 
PERB appointed mediator but did not conclude an agreement. The Association and 
the District returned to the bargaining table on August 22, 1996, with Esther Schultz, 
the Association's president and a member of its negotiating team, and Joseph 
DiVincenzo,. the .Association's chief spokesperson, representingiheL Association. 
Schultz testified that the District's sole representative at the meeting, Davis, told her 
and DiVincenzo that for the District to settle with the Association "before the teachers 
would be like wagging the tail of the elephant". DiVincenzo testified that Davis 
went on to say the elephant comment that the — that would be like — "If 
we settle with you first it would be like the 'tail wagging the elephant' and 
that there wouldn't be any settlement with us until there was movement 
with the teachers' association."3 
The Assistant Director found that the statements attributed to Davis evidenced 
the District's intention not to settle with the Association until it had reached agreement 
with the union representing the teachers. We have previously held that a party violates 
its duty to negotiate in good faith when it conditions the commencement or continuation 
of negotiations with the other party to the bargaining relationship on the conclusion of 
negotiations in a different unit.4 The record clearly evidences that both witnesses for 
the Association confirmed that Davis told them that concluding the nurses' contract 
3To the extent the record includes testimony regarding one-party conversations 
with the mediator, that testimony cannot be considered. Act, §205.4(b). Salmon River 
Cent. Sch. Dist. 10 PERB fl 3023 (1977V 
4Westchester County Med. Ctr. and Westchester County, 13 PERB 1J3038 
(1980). 
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negotiations before an agreement had been reached with the teachers' union would be 
like "letting the tail wag the elephant". We find no contradiction evidenced by the 
record. DiVincenzo's and Schultz's testimony about Davis' remarks corroborated each 
other and the District introduced no evidence to dispute their testimony. The record 
clearly supports the Assistant Director's finding that the District's strategy was to hold 
off reaching an agreement with the Association until it reached agreement with the 
larger teachers' union, a position clearly in violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the District's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Assistant Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from conditioning negotiations with the Association 
on the conduct or outcome of its negotiations with the union representing 
its teachers; and 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
larcXAbb'olt, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the East Ramapo Central School District (District) in the unit 
represented by the East Ramapo School Nurses Association, NEA/NY (Association) that the District 
will not condition negotiations with the Association on the conduct or outcome of its negotiations with 
the union representing its teachers. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester County Local 860, Unit 
9200 (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conditionally 
dismissing its charge that the County of Westchester (County) violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge alleges that the County 
unilaterally subcontracted work performed exclusively by employees in the unit 
represented by CSEA to a private corporation. The County alleges in its answer that 
CSEA has waived its right to negotiate the decision to subcontract. A hearing was held 
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on May 8, 1997, at which the parties entered into a stipulation of facts. The ALJ stated 
at the end of the hearing that the record was closed, but the ALJ did not set a date for 
briefs because the parties were discussing a possible settlement of the charge. The 
ALJ notified the parties by letter dated July 25, 1998 that the case had been placed on 
the "hold" calendar until August 25, 1997 pursuant to their agreement. The parties 
were informed in that same letter that "any party may request that [the case] be 
scheduled for another pre-hearing conference or set down for a hearing...."1 By letter 
dated August 22, 1997, CSEA asked the ALJ to accept, with the County's agreement, 
two additional stipulations of fact. The ALJ declined to accept the additional stipulations 
because the record had been closed. The ALJ then deferred consideration of the 
merits of the charge to the parties' binding grievance arbitration procedure. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions only that the ALJ erred when she denied its 
request to submit the additional stipulations of fact.2 The County has not responded to 
the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's ruling. 
It is not clear that this record was closed at the time CSEA made its motion on 
August 22, 1997. Although the ALJ stated on the record at the end of the May 8 
hearing that the record was closed, the ALJ's July 25 letter to the parties states that 
1The letter is a form letter used by staff ALJs to notify parties that a case is being 
held in abeyance. 
2CSEA takes no exception to the ALJ's decision to conditionally dismiss the 
charge. 
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any party could request that the matter be scheduled for conference or hearing. That 
letter is reasonably read to give either party the opportunity for an additional day of 
hearing, which would include evidence submitted under a joint stipulation of fact. 
The County consented to CSEA's request and no delay in processing would 
have been caused by the receipt of the additional stipulations. There was no prejudice 
to either of the parties or to the agency in accepting the proffered stipulation. Under 
these circumstances, we hold that the ALJ abused her discretion when she denied 
CSEA's motion to submit the two additional stipulations of fact. 
Based on the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are granted and the decision of the 
ALJ is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ include in the record the 
stipulations of fact proffered by CSEA for consideration if the case is reopened pursuant 
to the terms of the ALJ's decision conditionally dismissing the charge. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Tare A<-Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME N.Y. COUNCIL 66, and its affiliated 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME N.Y. Council 66, and its 
affiliated AFSCME Local 450 (City of Lackawanna White Collar Employees' Union) 
(AFSCME) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on its charge against 
the City of Lackawanna (City). AFSCME, which represents the City's full-time clerical 
employees, alleges that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it transferred office clerical work, allegedly exclusive to its 
unit, for performance by a few nonunit part-time employees. 
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After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge upon a finding that AFSCME did 
not have exclusivity,1 in fact,2 over office clerical work because a part-time clerical 
employee had been employed by the City in 1994 to do general clerical work in the 
Department of Development (DOD) before the work transfers at issue. 
AFSCME makes two basic arguments in itsexceptions, each directly or indirectly 
centering on the correctness of its being charged with knowledge that a part-time City 
employee had ever done office clerical work. First, AFSCME argues that it should not 
be charged with knowledge of that fact because there was and still is an uncertainty, 
stemming in part from the City's own representations, as to whether DOD and the 
Lackawanna Economic Development Zone (EDZ), a program within DOD, are even City 
departments. Second, that the record testimony of its witnesses, who were credited by 
the ALJ, is that they did not have actual knowledge until 1996 that the City had 
employed a nonunit part-time clerical since 19943 to do. general office work on a regular 
basis. The City has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered AFSCME's arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
1Under Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth.. 18 PERB fl3083 (1985), a union must 
prove exclusivity over the work which has been transferred from its unit before an 
employer is exposed to any decisional bargaining obligation with respect to that 
transfer of unit work. 
2
 State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs), 27 PERB 1J3027 (1994). 
3The length of time this employee worked on a part-time basis is somewhat 
unclear from the record, but it was of substantial duration, certainly sufficient to permit 
that employment to be considered in assessing AFSCME's exclusivity over office 
clerical work. 
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AFSCME's arguments rest on an alleged uncertainty as to the legal status of the 
DOD and the EDZ. This alleged uncertainty is very much overstated on this record. 
The record reveals quite clearly that DOD is a City department and that EDZ is a 
program within that department which operates with a combination of State and City 
funds. Source of funding for programs, however, has never itself controlled the 
employment status of any individual nor whether a program is a municipal function.4 
The EDZ Coordinator, for example, is a City employee, yet he is paid from the same 
funds which are used to pay the current part-time clerical who is assigned to the EDZ 
program. Douglas Druzbik, the DOD director, testified without qualification or rebuttal 
that persons working in DOD and EDZ are City employees. 
There is no reasonable basis on this record to reach any conclusion other than 
that DOD is a City department and that EDZ is a City program within that department. 
Persons working in those offices, whether full-time or part-time, are City employees like 
any others working for the City in any other of its departments. 
As to AFSCME's second argument, the very nature of office clerical work is the 
type of regular, open assignment this Board held in State of New York (Division of 
Military and Naval Affairs)5 is sufficient to prevent a union from establishing the needed 
exclusivity in fact over work transferred from a unit for performance by nonunit 
employees. Therefore, AFSCME's witnesses' testimony that they did not know until 
4See Somers Cent. Sch. Dist.. 12 PERB 1(3068 (1979); Amitvville Pub. Schs.. 
5 PERB U3043(1972). 
5Supra note 2. 
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late 1996 that a part-time employee was employed in DOD to do general clerical work, 
although credited by the ALJ, does not control the disposition of the question of its 
exclusivity over office clerical work. That work having been done openly, by a nonunit 
employee, AFSCME's agents cannot effectively disclaim knowledge for purposes of 
assessing AFSCME's claimed exclusivity over the work transferred. 
Having previously used a part-time employee to do unit work, the City's hiring of 
a few additional part-time employees to do office clerical work in two City departments 
was not subject to a decisional bargaining obligation under a charge grounded upon an 
alleged improper transfer of exclusive unit work. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and AFSCME's 
exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-17371 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
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HARDER, SILBER & BERGAN (RICHARD J. SILBER of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
GREGORY F. MEEHAN, ACTING COUNTY ATTORNEY (LORI A. ALESIO of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Westchester 
(County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) holding that the County 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally subcontracted the duties performed by registered professional nurses 
(RNs) at the Westchester County Medical Center (Center) correctional health services 
unit (CHS) to EMSA Correction Corporation (EMSA). The RNs, no longer employed by 
the County at CHS, were in a unit represented by the New York State Nurses 
Association (Association). The County admits that prisoner health care is now being 
provided by EMSA, but argues that the at-issue work was not exclusive to the 
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Association's bargaining unit and that the tasks performed by EMSA's Director of 
Nursing are not substantially similar to the work previously performed by the RNs 
serving as the Head Nurse and the Assistant Head Nurses. 
The ALJ held that the Association had established that it had exclusivity over the 
work performed by the RNs, Assistant Head Nurses and Head Nurses, and that the 
work being performed by the EMSA Director of Nursing was substantially similar to the 
work performed by the Head Nurse and Assistant Head Nurses. The ALJ, therefore, 
held that the County had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it subcontracted the work 
performed by unit employees at CHS to EMSA.1 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that nonunit licensed practical 
nurses (LPNs) employed by the County at CHS had performed the same duties as the 
RNs and that, therefore, the Association had failed to prove that the work had been 
exclusively performed by unit employees. The County also argues that the duties of 
EMSA's Director of Nursing are not substantially similar to the duties which had been 
performed by the Assistant Head Nurses and Head Nurse. The Association supports 
the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
Before the subcontract to EMSA, CHS ran six clinics for inmates at the County 
jail and penitentiary, staffed by a Head Nurse, three Assistant Head Nurses, RNs and 
1The ALJ found no violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act and no exceptions have 
been taken to that aspect of the decision. 
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LPNs.2 One clinic was open all the time, the other five were open from 8:30 a.m. to 
8:00 p.m. Inmates were seen pursuant to slips they filled out requesting care or on an 
emergency basis. Some were referred to the County's Medical Center. The RNs 
served as staff nurses at the clinics, where they screened patients upon admission, 
assessed the nature and the seriousness of the inmates' complaints, made referrals to 
the specialty clinics or the doctor, handled emergencies and rendered assistance to the 
doctor. RNs who were working at a specialty clinic returned to the primary clinic when 
the specialty clinic closed for the day. LPNs worked at the clinics with the RNs. LPNs 
performed duties similar to those performed by the RNs, but they could not run a clinic 
or be on duty at night. Most of the time they were on duty with an RN, however, an 
LPN would work in a clinic alone occasionally for an unspecified period of time. 
In asserting that the County's use of LPNs did not breach the RNs' exclusivity 
over nursing care, the Association argues that the LPNs did not fill in for RNs, the 
Assistant Head Nurses or the Head Nurse when any of them were on leave. The 
Association also points to Education Law §6902.1 and 2 as setting forth the duties of 
RNs and LPNs, respectively, as follows: 
1. The practice of the profession of nursing as a registered professional 
nurse is defined as diagnosing and treating human responses to actual or 
potential health problems through such services as casefinding, health 
teaching, health counseling, and provision of care supportive to or 
restorative of life and well-being, and executing medical regimens 
prescribed by a licensed physician, dentist or other licensed health care 
provider legally authorized under this title and in accordance with the 
commissioner's regulations. A nursing regimen shall be consistent with 
and shall not vary any existing medical regimen. 
2AII were in the Association's bargaining unit except for the LPNs. 
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2. The practice of nursing as a licensed practical nurse is defined as performing 
tasks and responsibilities within the framework of casefinding, health teaching, 
health counseling, and provision of supportive and restorative care under the 
direction of a registered professional nurse or licensed physician, dentist or 
other licensed health care provider legally authorized under this title and in 
accordance with the commissioner's regulations. 
Education Law §6903 requires that RNs and LPNs be licensed and §§6905 and 
6906 set out the respective licensing requirements for each, including education. RNs 
are subject to more stringent licensure and educational requirements than LPNs and 
are authorized to provide a higher level and broader scope of health services than 
LPNs. While RNs are authorized to independently perform services involving 
diagnosis and treatment, LPNs are to execute their duties under the direction of an RN 
or other licensed health care provider. The Association argues that the requirements of 
the Education Law itself warrant a finding that RNs and LPNs perform different duties. 
The Head Nurse and Assistant Head Nurses all were RNs. The Head Nurse 
was responsible for assigning staff, scheduling meetings, ensuring adequate staffing 
and the overall supervision of the nursing staff. The Head Nurse reported to the 
Deputy Director, who was under the supervision of the Associate Hospital Director. 
The three Assistant Head Nurses reported to the Head Nurse and directly supervised 
and worked with the staff nurses. The Assistant Head Nurses covered for each other 
and the Head Nurse when one of them was on leave. 
EMSA employs a Director of Nursing, an RN, who reports to the Health Services 
Administrator, who reports to the Medical Director. EMSA's Director of Nursing 
performs all the same duties as were performed by the Head Nurse and Assistant Head 
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Nurses, although she does not provide direct patient care, as did the Assistant Head 
Nurses. However, the Director of Nursing is also responsible, within EMSA guidelines, 
for administering the budget and interviewing, hiring and firing the staff she supervises. 
The Director of Nursing may also fill in for the Health Services Administrator when that 
person is absent or on leave. The clinics and infirmary run by EMSA are staffed by 
RNs, LPNs, emergency medical technicians and a coordinator. The infirmary is open 
twenty-four hours a day and is staffed by an RN. The duties of the RNs and the LPNs 
employed by EMSA include all of the duties performed by the RNs and LPNs previously 
employed by the County at CHS. 
The ALJ applied the test set forth in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority3 
(hereafter Niagara Frontier), which holds: 
With respect to the unilateral transfer of unit work, the initial essential 
questions are whether the work had been performed by unit employees 
exclusively (footnote omitted) and whether the reassigned tasks are 
substantially similar to those previously performed by unit employees. If 
both these questions are answered in the affirmative, there has been a 
violation of §209-a.1 (d), unless the qualifications for the job have been 
changed significantly. Absent such a change, the loss of unit work to the 
unit is sufficient detriment for the finding of a violation. If, however, there 
has been a significant change in the job qualifications, then a balancing 
test is invoked; the interests of the public employer and the unit 
employees, both individually and collectively, are weighed against each 
other, (at 3182). 
The ALJ determined that the subcontracted work had been performed exclusively by 
employees in the Association's bargaining unit. The record in this regard does not 
support the ALJ's finding. 
318PERBfi3083(1985). 
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The Association's own witness stated that the LPNs performed work similar to 
the RNs. The Association argues, however, that the LPNs are statutorily precluded 
from performing the duties performed by the RNs,4 an argument focusing on those 
duties which an LPN can legally be required to perform, rather than on the duties 
actually performed at CHS by the LPNs. Such an argument, although raised in a 
different context, was specifically rejected in Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School 
District (hereafter Hewlett-Woodmere).5 There, the District argued that the duties 
under law of a school librarian were substantially different from a library media 
specialist so that its unilateral transfer of the library media specialist's duties to the 
nonunit position of school librarian did not violate the Act. Focusing on the duties 
actually performed by the library media specialist, we said: "In making the equivalency 
determination, the relevant examination is of the duties actually performed, not the 
duties that can be required."6 The library media specialist had not performed any of the 
duties specific to that title. Rather, the library media specialist had actually functioned 
only as a school librarian. When the District transferred those duties outside the unit to 
the school librarian, we found substantial similarity of tasks by examining the duties 
actually performed. In Hewlett-Woodmere, we rejected the District's claim that the 
Statutory limitations alone cannot compel a determination on exclusivity, but 
may be considered as one of the bases in our analysis of the circumstances under 
which the duties of the RNs and LPNs have been performed. See Union-Endicott Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 29 PERB 1J3056 (1996) (appeal pending). 
528 PERB H3039 (1995), cont'd, 232 A.D.2d 560, 29 PERB fi7019 (2d Dep't 
1996). 
6]d at 3090 (1995). 
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focus of the inquiry should be on the duties or tasks which might be required of the 
library media specialist under law. 
As duty differences under law were unavailing to the employer in Hewlett-
Woodmere, we must similarly reject the Association's argument that we should, in 
assessing its exclusivity over nursing care, look only to the duties that the Education 
Law permits LPNs to perform. Our inquiry focuses on the duties actually performed by 
the RNs and LPNs at CHS. Here, the record is replete with evidence of the many 
duties performed by RNs in the CHS. But proof that RNs did nursing duties does not 
establish that the RNs performed those duties exclusively. Therefore, the Association 
has failed to satisfy its burden to prove exclusivity. Indeed, what evidence there is on 
the record is inconsistent with the Association's claim of exclusivity. The Association's 
own witness testified that the LPNs regularly performed duties similar to those 
undertaken by the RNs, and they could point to no significant differences between the 
work actually done by RNs and LPNs. As the inquiry centers on tasks performed, that 
the RNs may bring to bear greater knowledge, skill, training or qualifications on the 
delivery of those services is not material to an exclusivity evaluation. On the basis of 
this record, we cannot find that the RNs' work in the CHS was exclusive to the 
Association's bargaining unit. The County's transfer of the RNs' duties to EMSA, 
therefore, did not violate the Act. 
The ALJ also found that the work of the Assistant Head Nurses and the Head 
Nurse was exclusive to the Association's bargaining unit and that the duties of the 
Director of Nursing were substantially similar to the duties of the Assistant Head Nurses 
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and the Head Nurse. The record supports the finding that the duties of the Head Nurse 
and the supervisory duties of the Assistant Head Nurses were performed exclusively by 
bargaining unit members. However, the duties of EMSA's Director of Nursing are not 
substantially similar to the duties of the Head Nurse and the supervisory duties of the 
Assistant Head Nurses. 
The ALJ relied on the decision in Hyde Park Central School District7 (hereafter 
Hyde Park), as a basis for the analysis of the transfer of unit work from the bargaining 
unit to the Director of Nursing. The ALJ determined that the duties of the Head Nurse 
and the Director of Nursing were substantially similar, although finding that the Director 
of Nursing exercises far greater authority than the Head Nurse. The ALJ decided that 
because the County had introduced no evidence of an intent to alter its supervisory 
scheme, a factor present in Hyde Park, the changes in the level of supervision, 
standing alone, were not sufficient to justify the County's unilateral action. However, 
because we find that the duties of the Director of Nursing differ substantially from the 
duties of the Head Nurse and the Assistant Head Nurses, we need not reach an 
analysis of the County's supervisory scheme and a comparison of the qualifications for 
each title. 
721 PERB 1J3011 (1988). In Hyde Park, it was determined that although the 
duties assigned to a nonunit supervisory position encompassed all of the duties of a 
unit position, there was no violation of the Act because the authority of the nonunit 
supervisor "vastly" exceeded that of the former unit position, and the qualifications for 
the new position had significantly changed as part of the employer's decision to alter or 
redeploy supervisory responsibilities as part of a new supervisory system it had 
created. It was concluded that some weight must be accorded a public employer's right 
to alter or redeploy its supervisory responsibilities, at least to the extent of not 
considering the unit position's supervisory duties in isolation from the supervisory 
system established by the employer. 
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Here, the duties of the Director of Nursing, a supervisory title, include all the 
supervisory duties of the former Head Nurse and Assistant Head Nurses, both 
supervisory titles within the Association's bargaining unit. There the similarities end. 
EMSA's Director of Nursing has significantly increased responsibilities and authority 
beyond that of even the Head Nurse. The Director of Nursing may hire, fire, discipline 
and increase salaries. Utilization of EMSA's services has resulted in the total 
elimination of the Assistant Head Nurses, the intermediate level of supervision. The 
Director of Nursing not only has more authority than the former Head Nurse, she 
exercises the direct supervisory authority that was exercised by the Assistant Head 
Nurses, but without the intervening level of supervision and without the responsibilities 
of the Assistant Head Nurses to provide direct patient care. The title of Director of 
Nursing is a composite of the two unit positions but with more independence, more 
authority and different duties and responsibilities. 
As was stated in Niagara Frontier and reiterated in Hyde Park, in determining 
whether there has been an improper unilateral transfer of unit work, the initial essential 
questions are: 1) whether the at-issue work had been performed exclusively by unit 
employees and 2) whether the reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those 
previously performed by unit employees. Inasmuch as we find that the second of these 
questions must be answered in the negative because the duties performed by the 
Director of Nursing are not substantially similar to the duties of the Head Nurse and 
Assistant Head Nurses, the charge in this respect must also be dismissed. 
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Based on the foregoing, we grant the exceptions of the County and, accordingly, 
reverse the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Westchester 
(County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) holding that it violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
subcontracted the renal dialysis duties of registered professional nurses (RNs) 
employed at the Westchester County Health Center (WCHC) to Dialysis Clinics, Inc. 
(DCl). The RNs were in a unit represented by the New York State Nurses Association 
(Association).1 
) 1Some of the RNs are still employed by the County at different facilities and in different 
titles. 
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The ALJ determined that the RNs in the Association's unit had exclusively 
performed all the duties which were subcontracted to DCI and that the duties of the DCI 
employees were substantially similar to the duties performed by the RNs previously 
employed by the County at the WCHC renal center (center). The County excepts to the 
ALJ's decision, arguing that the Association lacked exclusivity because licensed 
practical nurses (LPNs) and medical doctors employed by the County at WCHC had 
performed the same duties as the RNs. Additionally, the County argues that the duties 
of the Nurse Manager employed by DCI are not substantially similar to the duties of the 
Head Nurse formerly employed by the County. The Association supports the decision 
of the ALJ. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, in part, and reverse, in part. 
The County employed at WCHC a Head Nurse, a Clinician, Charge Nurses, Staff 
Nurses and Home Training Nurses, all of whom were RNs. Physicians, Medical 
Technicians and LPNs also worked at WCHC. The center provided services to patients 
in adult and pediatric intensive care units (ICUs), the center's inpatient and outpatient 
units, and a home training program to teach patients to do dialysis at home. 
The Staff Nurses were assigned to the center and the ICUs, where they were 
responsible for direct patient care. There were approximately forty Staff Nurses2 at the 
center and their duties included: finding access for the two needles required for dialysis, 
2The Staff Nurses were primary care nurses, which meant that they were assigned to 
patients, were primarily responsible for their care and followed them from treatment to 
treatment. 
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hooking a patient up to the dialysis machines, performing blood transfusions and 
administering narcotics as needed, monitoring a patient throughout the dialysis 
process, removing a patient from dialysis, reviewing the doctor's orders and completing 
patient flow sheets and nursing orders. Staff Nurses set up, initiate and monitor 
patients receiving continuous veno-venous_ hemofiltration (CVVH).3 Only Staff Nurses 
could treat patients with acute conditions or young children. 
Staff Nurses also performed dialysis on patients in WCHC's pediatric and adult 
ICUs. Technicians transported the equipment to the patient's room where the Staff 
Nurse took over, performing all the duties which were performed in the clinics for 
patients on dialysis. 
Charge Nurses were assigned to the center, where one Charge Nurse was 
assigned to each unit and was responsible for the flow of patients, assignment of 
nurses to patients, operation of dialysis machines and problem-solving. Charge Nurses 
spent approximately fifty percent of their time on direct patient care. Charge Nurses 
were also responsible for teaching patients how to do dialysis at home. Their unit was 
separate from both the inpatient and outpatient units. In the course of teaching 
patients, they performed dialysis. They also visited patients at home to monitor their 
progress. 
The center employed one Clinician, who was in charge of staff education and in-
service training in dialysis. The Clinician gave most classes, unless a doctor was called 
3CVVH is a renal replacement therapy primarily done for ICU patients and entails a 
slow, continuous filtration of blood at the patient's bedside over the course of several 
days. 
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upon by the Clinician to teach regarding a certain medical condition. The Clinician was 
also part of the center's interdisciplinary team, which reviewed problems and ensured 
standards were met, as part of the center's quality assurance plan.4 
The Head Nurse had general responsibility for the center, including patient and 
staff scheduling and assignments, and related administrative duties. While the Head 
Nurse could change the RNs' schedules or request overtime for RNs, such a request 
required a supervisor's approval. The Head Nurse could conduct employee interviews, 
but could not hire or fire, transfer employees or increase their wages. The Head Nurse 
operated a dialysis machine only in an emergency. When the Head Nurse was out, the 
Clinician covered her duties. 
Two LPNs were employed at the center, usually not working on the same shift. 
They took vital signs, connected patients to the dialysis machines and monitored vitals 
during dialysis. LPNs could not assess a patient's condition or hang blood. The LPNs 
reported to an RN and together they reviewed a patient's condition. If an LPN 
programmed a dialysis machine, it had to be reviewed by the Charge Nurse. RNs 
supervised the LPN's maintenance of the flow sheets. Also, LPNs did not work in the 
ICUs or with young children or any patients with acute conditions. 
Patient Care Technicians were responsible for the maintenance and set up of 
dialysis machines, but they had no patient care responsibilities. Likewise, physicians 
did not perform the duties of the nursing staff, although occasionally they did dialyze 
4The team was made up of the Clinician, a physician, a dietician and a social worker. 
This team made most of the center's quality assurance determinations. 
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patients and utilize a catheter, and some doctors in the renal fellows training program 
did dialysis, but only under the supervision of an RN or attending physician. 
After the County subcontracted to DCI, a Nurse Manager assumed the 
responsibilities of the Head Nurse, but with the additional responsibilities of hiring, 
setting salaries and giving bonuses, all within DCI guidelines. Two Clinical Specialists, 
also RNs, are employed by DCI to perform the education duties previously performed 
by the Clinician. In addition to the Clinical Specialists, DCI employs a Quality 
Assurance Nurse to perform the quality assurance duties of the former Clinician. 
Charge Nurses, RNs, LPNs and Technicians perform the same functions for DCI as 
their counterparts did under the County's employ. 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority5 requires in subcontracting cases that 
the charging party establish that the work in issue was performed exclusively by 
employees in its bargaining unit and that the subcontracted work is substantially similar 
to the unit's work. 
The ALJ decided that the duties of the Charge and Staff Nurses, "intrinsic to the 
dialysis process", were exclusive to the Association's bargaining unit. We disagree. 
The record establishes that in both the inpatient and outpatient units, where the vast 
majority of the RNs worked and where most of the work of the renal dialysis center was 
performed, the connecting of a patient to the dialysis machine, monitoring the patient 
while on the dialysis machine, recording the patient's condition before and after dialysis, 
terminating dialysis and completing the flow chart are all duties that were regularly 
518PERB TJ3083(1985). 
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performed by the two LPNs on a daily basis. In County of Westchester,6 decided by us 
today, the Association argued, as it does here, that the inherent differences in the 
duties of RNs and LPNs set forth in the Education Law warrant a finding that the LPNs 
did not, and could not, perform the duties of the RNs. For the reasons set forth in that 
decision, we reject the Association's argument. 
Here, the LPNs regularly perform the core duties performed by the RNs in the 
care of dialysis patients. That the RNs may generally supervise the LPNs in the 
performance of those duties does not alter the nature of the tasks performed by the 
LPNs. In Town of Brookhaven,7 it was noted that this Board has "not recognized a 
discernible boundary when we have been unable to identify a reasonable relationship 
between the components of the discernible boundary and the duties of unit employees." 
There is here no boundary that can reasonably be drawn around the work of the RNs in 
direct patient care at the center that would preserve the Association's exclusivity over 
that work other than that grounded upon provisions of the Education Law, which we 
have rejected. 
As to the other duties performed only by RNs, such as in the ICUs and in the 
home training unit, the specific tasks of blood transfusion and the administration of 
narcotics, we hold that the subcontracting of those duties does not violate the Act. The 
core component of the unit work is the care and treatment of patients requiring renal 
dialysis. That RNs exclusively performed a certain few tasks that are peripheral to the 
6County of Westchester, 31 PERB TJ3033 (August 17, 1998) (Case No. U-17371). 
7
 27 PERB 1J3063, at 3147 (1994), quoting from Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist., 26 
PERB H3075, at 3145 (1993). 
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intrinsic duties of the unit cannot retain for the unit exclusivity over these peripheral 
duties when exclusivity over the core duties has not been established. We have held 
that a union does not lose exclusivity over the work of unit employees simply because 
one or more nonunit employees has occasionally done that same work as an incidental 
aspect of performing broader functions.8 The converse must, likewise, be true. Where 
a union has never acquired or has lost exclusivity over the major aspects of the work at 
issue, exclusivity is not possessed as to tasks incidental to the performance of the core 
components of that unit work, even if only unit employees have performed those 
incidental tasks. 
As to the Head Nurse, for the reasons set forth in our decision in County of 
Westchester, supra, we hold that the duties of the Director of Nursing are not 
substantially similar to the duties performed by the Head Nurse and that the County did 
not violate the Act when it subcontracted the duties of the Head Nurse to DCI.9 
The record, however, supports the ALJ's finding that the Association has 
established exclusivity over the work performed by the Clinician. The Clinician had no 
direct patient care responsibilities, as did the RNs. The Clinician performed duties that 
were not performed by any other employees. That the Clinician served on the center's 
quality assurance team does not destroy exclusivity. The Clinician's duties were 
specific to that title. Other members of the quality assurance team had their own 
8$££, fi^u, Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist., 29 PERB 1J3056 (1996) (appeal pending). 
9The County raised for the first time in its brief to the ALJ that its subcontracting to DCI 
was part of a plan to alter the supervisory structure of the unit. The ALJ correctly 
disallowed this argument because there is no evidence in the record to support it. 
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duties, based upon their positions, training and expertise. The ad hoc teaching by a 
physician of a specific class, at the Clinician's request, does not affect the exclusivity of 
the Clinician's in-service training duties. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the exceptions of the County as to the Clinician 
and affirm the decision of the ALJ as to the Clinician. We grant the exceptions of the 
County as to the remainder of the unit and, accordingly, reverse the ALJ's decision in 
that respect. 
We hold that the County violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
subcontracted to DCI the duties performed by the Clinician. In all other respects, the 
charge is dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Immediately restore to the Association's unit the duties previously performed 
at the renal center by the Clinician; 
2. Forthwith offer reinstatement to a Clinician position to the employee who held 
the position at the renal center who was terminated or transferred as a result of 
the subcontract of those duties to DCI; 
3. Make the employee who held the Clinician position whole for the loss of 
wages, benefits and conditions of employment, if any, caused by the 
County's subcontract to DCI of the Clinician's duties at the renal center, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate; and 
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4. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all locations ordinarily used to 
post notices of information to employees in the Association's unit. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
i 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Westchester (County) in the unit represented by the New York State Nurses Association 
(Association) that the County will: 
1. Immediately restore to the Association's unit the duties previously performed at the renal center by the Clinician. 
' Forthwith offer reinstatement to a Clinician position to the employee who held that position at the renal center who 
was terminated or transferred as a result of the subcontract of those duties to Dialysis Clinics, Inc. (DCI). 
3. Make the employee who held the Clinician position whole for the loss of wages, benefits and conditions of 
employment, if any, caused by the County's subcontract to DCI of the Clinician's duties at the renal center, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
"i /Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-17467 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
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HARDER, SILBER & BERGAN (RICHARD J. SILBER of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
GREGORY F. MEEHAN, ACTING COUNTY ATTORNEY (LORI A. ALESIO of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Westchester 
(County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) holding that the County 
had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally subcontracted to EMSA Correction Corporation (EMSA) the duties 
performed by registered professional nurses (RNs) in the Westchester County Medical 
Center (WCMC) Forensic unit. The RNs were in a unit represented by the New York 
State Nurses Association (Association).1 
1Some of the RNs are still employed by the County at different facilities and in different 
titles. 
Board - U-17467 -2 
The Forensic unit is a fifteen-bed inpatient psychiatric unit located at the 
Westchester County jail. It houses inmates from the County jail and penitentiary who 
have psychiatric disorders. The unit operated with two shifts, 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week. As relevant to the case before us, one Head Nurse was assigned to the 
unit, who reported to the Nursing Supervisor. There were three Assistant Head Nurses, 
15 Staff Nurses, six Senior Psychiatric Assistants (SPAs) and one Licensed Practice 
Nurse (LPN) assigned to the unit. The Head Nurse, Assistant Head Nurses and Staff 
Nurses were all in the unit represented by the Association; the SPAs and the LPN were 
not. 
The Head Nurse, a RN, worked during the day, eight hours a day, five days a 
week. The Head Nurse held the ultimate responsibility for all patient care in the 
Forensic unit, although her responsibilities were primarily administrative and rarely 
clinical. The Head Nurse attended meetings, made policy, scheduled and evaluated the 
unit's staff and, in emergencies, did patient care. When the Head Nurse was on leave, 
one of the Assistant Head Nurses covered her responsibilities. 
The three Assistant Head Nurses, all RNs, worked three shifts a week, two on the 
night shift and one on the day shift. They assigned work to Staff Nurses, the LPN and 
the SPAs. They did daily scheduling, maintained patient records, and performed quality 
assurance duties. Most of their time, however, was involved in direct patient care, 
involving patient assessment, therapy, and medications, as well as making rounds with 
the physician. When the Assistant Head Nurse was absent, the RN assumed the duties 
of the Assistant Head Nurse. 
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The RNs implemented admission procedures, did one-on-one patient interviews 
to assess nursing needs, completed admission papers, developed a treatment plan, 
conducted patient orientation sessions and recorded medication orders from the 
physician. RNs also were responsible for patient discharge procedures and records. 
On a daily basis, RNs dispensed medication,2 diagnosed patients, provided medical 
treatment, including changing bandages, charted patient progress and updated 
computer records. RNs also accepted telephone orders for medication changes from 
physicians and authorized correctional staff to restrain patients as necessary. Group 
therapy sessions for the inmates were provided at the Forensic unit. Physicians, social 
workers and nurses ran the groups, although an RN attended every session. 
Only one LPN was assigned to the Forensic unit and had been there for only a 
year and a half. On the days the LPN was scheduled, one RN worked as the Charge 
Nurse and one RN did admissions and discharges. The LPN dispensed medication, did 
treatments and changed dressings, recorded patients' progress in the patient medical 
records and picked up physicians' orders. RNs closely supervised the LPN when 
medication was dispensed. The LPN could not be alone in the unit or be alone with a 
patient. The LPN never did patient assessment, paperwork, admissions or discharges, 
treatment plans, computer work or new patient orientation sessions, nor did the LPN 
take telephone orders from a physician. 
2Physicians ordered the medication, some of which was prescribed on an "as needed" 
) basis. The RNs were authorized to determine when and whether a patient required this 
medication and to dispense it based upon that assessment. 
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The SPAs monitored and supervised patients, conducted a head count every 
half hour, checked vital signs, engaged in recreational activities with the patients and 
helped the patients with "the activity of daily living".3 SPAs also stayed with patients 
who had been restrained, but RNs and LPNs also performed that duty. 
EMSA employs a Director of Nursing for Forensic Mental Health who performs all 
the duties formerly performed by the Head Nurse and the Assistant Head Nurses with 
respect to completing paperwork, attending meetings, and scheduling and evaluating 
staff. The Director of Nursing also administers the budget, interviews, hires, fires, and 
determines discipline and salary increases, within EMSA guidelines. The RNs and 
LPNs employed by EMSA perform the same duties as were performed by the 
employees in those titles employed by the County. 
The ALJ decided that the Association had established exclusivity over all the 
work performed by the RNs, except for staying with restrained patients, which was also 
performed by the SPAs, and medical treatment, as that was also performed by the 
doctors. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the Association has not 
established its exclusivity over the work in issue because nonunit personnel shared RN 
duties and that the duties of EMSA's Director of Nursing are not substantially similar to 
the duties of the Head Nurse. The Association argues that the duties of RNs and LPNs 
3This was intended to help the patients bathe, shave, wear clean clothes and feed 
themselves. 
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are inherently different, based upon statutory considerations,4 and that the ALJ's 
decision should be affirmed. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, in part, and reverse, in part. 
As we noted in County of Westchester,5 issued today, the standard that must be 
met is that articulated in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority,6 which requires in a 
subcontracting case that the charging party establish that the subcontracted work had 
been performed exclusively by its bargaining unit personnel and that the work as 
transferred is substantially similar to the work formerly performed by unit employees. 
Here, the record supports the ALJ's finding that the duties of the RNs have been 
exclusively performed by the RNs in the Association's bargaining unit. In addition, the 
ALJ correctly determined that there is no exclusivity as to either staying with restrained 
patients because the LPN and the SPAs had performed that task or medical treatment 
decisions because the doctors had performed that function. 
The duties of the RNs in implementing admission procedures, conducting patient 
interviews, developing nursing treatment plans, completing admission and discharge 
paperwork, conducting orientation sessions and medication group sessions, updating 
computer records, taking doctors' telephone orders, assessing the need for "as needed" 
4The Association relies upon Education Law §6902.1 and §6902.2 which define the 
practice of nursing by a registered professional nurse and a licensed practical nurse, 
respectively. 
5County of Westchester, 31 PERB lf3033 (August 17, 1998) (Case No. U-17371). 
18 PERB 1[3083(1985). 
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medications and ordering that patients be restrained are exclusive to the RNs in the 
Association's bargaining unit. These duties are the "core component" of the unit's work 
in the Forensic unit. In County of Westchester7, issued today, we held that the 
exclusive performance by unit employees of a few duties incidental or peripheral to the 
intrinsic or core components of the work transferred from the unit was insufficient to 
establish or maintain exclusivity over the intrinsic work of the unit if nonunit employees 
had regularly performed the core components of the work. Here, the LPN performed 
only minor medical duties with respect to dispensing medication, changing bandages, 
recording daily progress notes in patient medical records and picking up written orders 
from doctors. This work, performed by one nonunit employee, is not the primary work 
, of the RNs in the unit and cannot deprive the Association of exclusivity over the work of 
the RNs, which, at times, includes some of the same work as performed by the LPN. 
As we decided in both County of Westchester decisions, supra, the duties of the 
Director of Nursing are not substantially similar to those of the Head Nurse and the 
Assistant Head Nurses and the County's subcontract of the Head Nurse or Assistant 
Head Nurses' duties not involving direct patient care does not violate the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the exceptions filed by the County as to the 
RNs and affirm the decision of the ALJ in that respect. We grant the County's 
exceptions as to the Head Nurse and Assistant Head Nurses' performance of 
supervisory and quality assurance duties. As to those, the ALJ's decision is reversed 
and the charge is dismissed. 
\ 
; 
7County of Westchester, 31 PERB 1J3034 (August 17, 1998) (Case No. U-17372). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the County: 
1. Immediately restore to the Association's unit the following duties 
previously performed in the Forensic unit by registered nurses: 
implementing admission procedures, conducting patient interviews, 
developing nursing treatment plans, completing admission and..discharge 
paperwork, conducting orientation sessions and medication group 
sessions, updating computer records, taking doctors' telephone orders, 
assessing the need for "as needed" medication and ordering that patients 
be restrained; 
2. Forthwith offer reinstatement to their former positions in the Forensic 
unit to any registered nurses previously included in the Association's unit, 
if any, who were terminated or transferred as a result of the subcontract of 
the duties listed in paragraph 1 above to EMSA; 
3. Make such employees whole for the loss of wages, benefits and 
conditions of employment, if any, caused by the County's subcontract of 
the duties in the Forensic unit listed in paragraph 1 above to EMSA, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate; and 
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4. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all locations ordinarily 
used to post notices of information to Association unit employees. 
-8 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
re A: Abbott; Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
...NEW YORK STATE...... 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Westchester in the unit represented by the New York State Nurses Association 
(Association) that the County will: 
1. Immediately restore to the Association's unit the following duties previously performed in the Forensic unit 
by registered nurses: implementing admission procedures, conducting patient interviews, developing 
nursing treatment plans, completing admission and discharge paperwork, conducting orientation sessions 
and medication group sessions, updating computer records, taking doctors' telephone orders, assessing 
the need for "as needed" medication and ordering that patients be restrained. 
2 'orthwith offer reinstatement to their former positions in the Forensic unit to any registered nurses 
previously included in the Association's unit, if any, who were terminated or transferred as a result of the 
subcontract of the duties listed in paragraph 1 above to EMSA. 
3. Make such employees whole for the loss of wages, benefits and conditions of employment, if any, caused 
by the County's subcontract of the duties in the Forensic unit listed in paragraph 1 above to EMSA, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
a }ther material. 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
MANAGERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. C-4609 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM, 
Employer, 
-and-
SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF PUTNAM, 
,) Intervenor. 
WILLIAM J. MCNAMARA, for Petitioner 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER & DROHAN (JOHN M. DONOGHUE 
and STUART S. WAXMAN of counsel), for Employer 
DECATALDO and DECATALDO (ROBERT T. DECATALDO of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions filed, respectively, by 
the elected Sheriff of the County of Putnam (Sheriff) and the County of Putnam 
(County) to an interim decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) issued pursuant to a representation petition filed by the 
) 
Putnam County Sheriffs Office Managers Association (Association). The Association 
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seeks to become the bargaining agent for a unit consisting of currently unrepresented 
lieutenants, captains and a chief criminal investigator working within the Sheriffs 
Department. 
The County and the Sheriff dispute the identity of the employer of these 
employees. The County argues that it is their sole employer. The Sheriff argues that 
Sheriffs department personnel are employed jointly by the elected Sheriff and the 
County. The County also argues that the at-issue employees are not eligible for 
representation because they are managerial within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The Director severed the employer issue from the other questions raised by the 
petition and held that an elected Sheriff is not a joint employer for purposes of the Act. 
The Director held that the County is the sole employer of the Sheriffs department 
personnel. 
The Sheriff asks us to review the Director's holding that an elected Sheriff is not 
an employer, joint or otherwise, of Sheriffs department personnel. The County cross-
excepts only to the Director's failure to consider certain additional facts allegedly 
supporting the Director's decision. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we decline to hear the exceptions 
and cross-exceptions at this time because there are still open questions concerning 
representation under this petition. 
The Director's interim decision represents his ruling on only one of the 
representation questions raised by the petition. Review of such a ruling is by 
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permission only pursuant to §201.9(c)(4) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). The 
exceptions which may be filed as of right under §201.12 of the Rules are those to the 
Director's final decision, which issues under §201.11 of the Rules "upon completion of 
proceedings" before the Director. The proceedings before the Director have not been 
completed. There remain undecided questions concerning at least the eligibility of any 
of the employees for representation and the appropriate uniting of any persons found 
eligible for representation. 
This Board has held repeatedly that permission to appeal rulings made in 
conjunction with the processing of a representation petition will not be granted absent 
extraordinary circumstances.1 The novelty of the issue2 presented in this case does not 
establish an extraordinary circumstance justifying review of the Director's interim ruling 
on identity of employer when other representation questions are still pending. 
Circumstances actually disfavor our granting permission for appeal from the Director's 
interim ruling because the issue we are asked to decide now might later be mooted by 
a determination that the employees are managerial as claimed by the County. The 
Director's ruling on the employer question can be fully reviewed, as necessary, upon 
exceptions taken to the final decision on the petition.3 Continuing our policy of 
1Town of Sauqerties. 30 PERB fl3002 (1997); Town of Putnam Valley and Town 
of New Paltz. 28 PERB H3049 (1995). 
2The status of an elected sheriff as an employer of sheriffs department 
personnel was specifically left open under the Board's decision in County of Nassau 
and Nassau County Sheriff. 25 PERB TJ3036 (1992), involving an appointed sheriff. 
3Greenburqh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist.. 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); State of 
New York (Div. of Parole), 25 PERB 1J3007 (1992); North Babylon Union Free Sch. 
Dist.. 20 PERB 1J3028 (1987); United Univ. Professions, 19 PERB 1J3009 (1986). 
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withholding review of rulings made during the processing of representation petitions 
until a final decision issues will expedite the processing to completion of all petitions 
and will also, in this particular case, avoid our deciding a potentially academic 
question. 
For the reasons set forth above, we decline to consider the exceptions and 
cross-exceptions and remand the petition to the Director for further processing 
consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
) 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ULSTER 
COUNTY LOCAL 856, TOWN OF SHAWANGUNK 
HIGHWAY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-18126 
TOWN OF SHAWANGUNK, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
SHAW & PERELSON, L.L.P. (GARRETT L. SILVEIRA of counsel, for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) filed, respectively, by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Ulster County Local 856, 
Town of Shawangunk Highway Unit (CSEA) and the Town of Shawangunk (Town). 
CSEA alleges in the charge it filed against the Town that the Town violated §209-a.1 (d) 
; 
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of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted 
guardrail1 installation to a private contractor. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge pursuant to the Town's motion to 
dismiss.2 The ALJ held that CSEA did not have exclusivity in fact over guardrail 
installation because nonunit persons, specifically Jehovah's Witnesses, had once 
before installed guardrails on a public road running through their land within the Town. 
This conclusion is the basis for CSEA's exceptions. In reaching her conclusion, the ALJ 
held that guardrail installation by private contractors in the past did not breach CSEA's 
exclusivity because the guardrail installation was merely an incidental aspect of those 
larger construction projects. This and alleged changes in qualifications and guardrail 
post installation methods are the bases for the Town's cross-exceptions. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the one time guardrails were installed by 
Jehovah's Witnesses was both limited and not open, such that it did not know that work 
had been done until shortly before the hearing in this case. Therefore, CSEA argues 
that it has maintained exclusivity over the work of guardrail installation notwithstanding 
the work done by the Jehovah's Witnesses. CSEA argues that the ALJ erred in ruling 
that work done along a public road is perse open and regular and erred in excluding 
material and relevant evidence pursuant to that ruling. If the ALJ's decision is not 
1Both "guardrail" and "guiderail" are used to identify the traffic safety device at 
issue in this case. 
2The ALJ reserved decision on the motion made after CSEA had rested, after 
which the Town called one witness and then rested. The ALJ granted the motion after 
review of the record and consideration of the parties' briefs. 
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reversed, then CSEA argues that the case should be remanded for evidence regarding 
the circumstances under which the guardrails were installed on the road running 
through the Jehovah's Witnesses' land. 
The Town argues in response to CSEA's exceptions that the ALJ was correct in 
dismissing the charge because CSEA did not prove exclusivity in fact over guardrail 
installation. Apart from the work done by the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Town argues in 
its cross-exceptions that CSEA lost exclusivity over guardrail installation because of the 
Town's past use of private contractors to install guardrails. The Town argues 
additionally that the method of guardrail post installation has changed such that its 
employees are no longer qualified to perform a task which is substantially different from 
the task as previously performed. 
In response to the Town's cross-exceptions, CSEA argues that a qualifications 
change cannot be considered because it was never raised and was not proven, and 
that the cross-exceptions are otherwise without merit. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we deny the 
Town's cross-exceptions and remand the case to the ALJ pursuant to CSEA's 
exceptions. 
The subcontract at issue was to a private company for the installation of 
guiderails at an area known as Bordens Road Dam. The nature of the work being done 
by the contractor at that site is unclear from the record, but it appears to have involved 
moving existing guiderails and either reinstalling those or installing new posts and rails 
on both the dam and the adjacent roadway. The process of installation was different 
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from that which unit employees had used in the past. Pursuant to current state 
regulation, the posts were pounded into the surface, not placed into holes dug into the 
surface by employees using a mechanical auger. 
Turning first to the Town's cross-exceptions, the few instances in which 
guiderails were installed by. contractors before the. work at Bordens Road Dam were 
properly disregarded by the ALJ in assessing CSEA's exclusivity because the 
contractors' guiderail work was merely a minor, incidental part of a larger construction 
project.3 In this case, the contractor working at Bordens Road Dam appears to have 
been retained simply to remove, reinstall, and/or install guiderail posts and rails. 
That the posts are now pounded into the surface rather than inserted into holes 
dug into the surface with an auger is immaterial to an assessment of exclusivity.4 A 
change in qualifications was not raised by the Town. Even had such a change been 
raised, there is nothing in the record that would support a conclusion that the 
qualifications for the operation of a mechanical post pounder are any different than 
those for the operation of a mechanical auger, let alone "significantly" different as 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority5 requires before a balancing of the employer's 
and employees' interests is undertaken. Although the Town does not own a 
3The performance of unit work by nonunit personnel as an incident of a different 
set of tasks or a larger project does not breach a union's exclusivity over that unit work. 
Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist.. 29 PERB 1J3056 (1996) (appeal pending); Village of 
Malverne, 28 PERB 1J3042 (1995); County of Onondaga, 27 PERB 1J3048 (1994). 
4lt appears from the record that the method for hanging the guiderails or 
guidewire from the post once installed has not changed in any way. 
518PERB j[3083. 
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mechanical post pounder, that is also not relevant to our analysis because, as the ALJ 
found and the record shows, the Town rented the pounder the contractor used to do the 
work at Bordens Road Dam.6 Having made the pounder available to the contractor's 
employees, the Town could have made it available just as readily to its own employees. 
Having denied the Town's cross-exceptions, CSEA's exceptions remain for 
consideration. 
A charging party bears the burden to prove exclusivity overwork allegedly 
transferred improperly from its unit.7 The record in this case shows that nonunit 
persons, specifically members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, installed guiderails along 
Red Mills Road, a public road. CSEA, therefore, does not have exclusivity in fact over 
guardrail installation under State of New York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs) 
(hereafter State of New York)8 unless that work was done other than "openly and 
regularly". CSEA bears the burden of proof on its claim that the Red Mills Road 
installation was not open and regular because it is but part of the exclusivity element of 
its charge. 
In this case, the record does not provide any detail as to the circumstances 
under which the guiderails were installed by the Jehovah's Witnesses. We know from 
this record only that Red Mills Road is a public road running through private land of 
6Compare County of Clinton, 28 PERB P041 (1995)(subcontract no violation 
where employer had a history of using private contractors for major projects requiring 
specialized equipment which the employer did not own or otherwise provide). 
7County of Erie, 28 PERB 1J3053 (1995). 
'27 PERB U3027(1994). 
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considerable size. From this, the ALJ held that the work was "necessarily done in the 
open" because Red Mills Road is a public road. As there was no evidence regarding 
the circumstances under which that work was performed, the ALJ held that CSEA 
"failed to meet its burden of exclusivity." The absence of evidence in that regard, 
however, may have been attributable to a statement made by the ALJ during the 
hearing and it is for that reason that we conclude a remand is warranted. 
At the hearing, the ALJ interrupted CSEA's attorney's questioning of a witness to 
inquire as to whether Red Mills Road is a public road. After the.witness answered 
affirmatively, the ALJ stated: "I don't think I need more information on the Watch Tower 
Farms if it's a public road." The witness then answered a previously pending question 
regarding the size of the Jehovah's Witnesses' compound, and there were thereafter no 
other questions by either party representative probative of the circumstances in which 
the guiderails were installed on Red Mills Road. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's statement caused it to refrain from 
offering evidence about the circumstances under which the guardrails were installed by 
the Jehovah's Witnesses. We agree with CSEA that the ALJ's statement at the hearing 
might have dissuaded both party representatives from introducing evidence regarding 
the specific circumstances of the guiderail installation on Red Mills Road, 
circumstances relevant to a determination as to whether the guiderail installation was 
open and regular within the meaning of State of New York. 
Although CSEA failed to state on the record a specific exception to the ALJ's 
previously quoted statement, the articulation of an exception was not necessary to 
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preserve for it an opportunity to argue to us on appeal that the ALJ erred in effectively 
excluding evidence from the record pursuant to that statement.9 
As the parties may have been dissuaded by the ALJ's statement during the 
hearing from introducing evidence regarding the circumstances under which the 
guardrails were installed on Red Mills Road by the Jehovah's Witnesses, we remand 
the case to the ALJ for the receipt of such evidence through hearing or stipulation and 
for such subsequent decision as is then necessary and appropriate. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
r Marc A. Abbott, Member 
9See County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County. 25 PERB 1J3004 (1992). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-15220 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JANNA PFLUGER of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (CATHERINE BATTLE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge alleging that the County of 
Nassau (County) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally began using a new, computerized payroll system which 
changed or affected several mandatory subjects of negotiation. The County denied the 
material allegations of the charge and raised several affirmative defenses. 
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CSEA alleged that after the County began phasing in the NURHS system, a 
computerized payroll system, it unilaterally increased the lag in payment of overtime 
compensation to certain unit employees; combined overtime, night differential, 
nontaxable mileage, meal money and other allowances with regular wages into one 
paycheck, thereby resulting in increased tax and deferred compensation deductions; 
increased the time employees had to wait for an adjusted paycheck; discontinued the 
practice of allowing employees to use leave time during the period in which it was 
accrued; discontinued the practice of allowing employees to elect compensatory time 
for time worked on holidays; discontinued maintenance of an employee time and leave 
record; and discontinued the practice of issuing end-of-the-year paychecks. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge in its entirety, finding that, as to several 
allegations, there had been no change in practice and, as to the remaining allegations, 
the County was privileged to act as they involved nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
CSEA called several witnesses, including its labor relations specialist and local 
CSEA unit officers, working in various County departments. The County called two 
witnesses, including Augusta Furino, the County's payroll supervisor. Based upon her 
fifteen years in the County's payroll department, including five years as payroll 
supervisor, and her forthright, comprehensive testimony, complete with documentary 
evidence, the ALJ credited Furino's testimony over that of the CSEA witnesses, which 
was largely hearsay testimony and unsupported in several instances by any 
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documentary evidence. There is no record basis to disturb the ALJ's credibility 
resolutions. 
Overtime and Supplemental Checks 
There are 52 County Departments with approximately 18,000 full-time and 1,200 
part-time employees. All County employees are paid bi-weekly. CSEA employees 
receive their checks every other Thursday. Employees who had earned monies other 
than regular wages, such as overtime, received a supplemental check in the week 
between the regular paydays. After the County implemented the NURHS system, 
employees received one paycheck, on their usual payday, for their regular wages and 
any supplemental monies. Prior to the computerization of the payroll, the employees 
waited from four to six weeks for the payment of overtime. CSEA alleged that after 
NURHS, some employees in some departments had experienced an increase of up to 
one week in the amount of time they waited for overtime checks. CSEA further alleged 
that the inclusion of overtime, differentials and other allowances in the regular paycheck 
increased the amount of tax and deferred compensation being withheld from the 
paychecks.1 CSEA offered no documents supporting this allegation. 
The County's established practice is to issue paychecks to unit employees every 
two weeks. Because of its prior payroll system, the County was compelled to issue 
overtime checks as part of the supplemental payroll because it could not issue a 
paycheck based upon two different rates of pay. With the implementation of the 
1No evidence was offered with respect to meal allowances, night differential or 
other supplemental pay and the charge was dismissed as to those allegations. No 
exceptions were filed as to this aspect of the ALJ's decision. 
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NURHS system, the condition upon which the issuance of the overtime check 
depended no longer exists.2 The County is now capable of issuing a regular paycheck 
on the regular payday, consistent with its practice of paying these unit employees every 
two weeks. As the issuance of the overtime check as part of the supplemental payroll 
arose upon a condition, i.e., the inability to separate rates of pay, when NURHS 
technology eliminated that inability, the condition giving rise to the overtime checks no 
longer existed. Discontinuation of the overtime checks upon elimination of the condition 
which prompted them did not, therefore, change the County's practice. 
Additionally, Furino testified that employees generally waited less time to receive 
overtime compensation under the NURHS system because departments were able to 
enter the overtime information directly into the computer, rather than submit written 
forms to the County's Comptroller's office and then wait for authorization to payroll for 
payment of the overtime. Furino also testified that the overtime was always taxed as 
supplemental pay under the Internal Revenue Code and that the NURHS system was 
able to calculate the correct amount of taxes for regular wages and the correct amount 
for overtime in the same paycheck. As the record evidences no delay in receiving 
overtime payments and no increase in tax or deferred compensation contributions 
because of the issuance of one check, this aspect of the charge is dismissed. 
2Schalmont Cent. Sch. Dist.. 29 PERB p036 (1996); County of Nassau. 
27 PERB 1J3049 (1994); State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee 
Relations and Dep't of Health). 25 PERB U 3005 (1992), confd, 195 A.D.2d 930, 26 
PERB U 7008 (3d Dep't 1993); New York City Transit Auth., 24 PERB P013 (1991). 
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Re-issuance of Regular Paychecks 
When an employee was incorrectly paid in his or her regular paycheck or failed 
to receive a paycheck, the paycheck would be returned to the Comptroller's office and 
redeposited. CSEA alleges that under the prior payroll system, such an employee 
would receive the corrected paycheck in the next week as part of the supplemental 
payroll. Under NURHS, CSEA alleges that employees are forced to wait until the next 
regular payday to receive the corrected paycheck. Furino testified that employees had 
always received the corrected paycheck on the next regular payday, unless a special 
request was made because the affected employee would suffer serious financial 
difficulty if the pay was not forthcoming. Furino testified that this was still the practice 
and CSEA's witnesses agreed that since the implementation of NURHS they have 
made such requests on behalf of unit employees, which have been honored by the 
County. As the record does not support CSEA's allegation that there has been a 
change in past practice, this aspect of the charge is dismissed. 
Use of Leave Time Within the Pay Period Earned 
Unit employees accrue one-half day of vacation time and one-half day of sick 
time per every two-week pay period. CSEA alleges that unit employees had been 
allowed to use such leave time during the pay period in which it was accrued, until the 
implementation of NURHS. Furino testified that it has always been the County's 
practice that time may not be used during the pay period in which it was accrued. 
Under the prior payroll system, whenever the Comptroller's office became aware of a 
situation in which a department had allowed an employee to utilize sick or vacation 
leave in the pay period in which it was earned, the department was notified that this 
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was contrary to the County's policy and that the employee must make the necessary 
adjustments to his or her time records. Furino's testimony was confirmed by Eileen 
Vogel, assistant to the County's Director of Labor Relations, who testified that she had 
been part of the County's negotiating team for the County-CSEA contract. She had 
advised the programmers when NURHS was being implemented as to the provisions of 
the County-CSEA collective bargaining agreement, including the point in time at which 
leave was accrued. Based on Furino's and Vogel's testimony, the ALJ determined that 
CSEA had not established any change in practice with respect to the use of accrued 
time. As the record supports the ALJ's findings, this allegation is dismissed.3 
Employee Time and Leave Record 
Prior to the implementation of the NURHS system, employees received a time 
and leave record at the beginning of each year which listed their accumulated accruals 
and upon which they could record accrual and usage of time throughout the year. That 
has not changed. What has changed is that the County no ionger manually enters time 
and leave information on a time card for its record-keeping purposes. Such information 
is maintained in the NURHS system and each department has access to the 
information through computers in each personnel department. The difference is that 
employees wishing to check their balances now must view a computer screen and 
receive a computer printout rather than reviewing a time and leave card. While the 
information may take slightly longer to access and the computer screens and/or 
3CSEA also alleged that after NURHS was implemented employees were not 
allowed to use compensatory time during the pay period in which it was earned. The 
ALJ dismissed that allegation for failure of proof. No exceptions have been taken to 
this aspect of the ALJ's decision. 
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printouts are not in the old format and may prove more difficult to understand initially, 
there is no violation of the Act. An employer may maintain a record of attendance of its 
employees and the maintenance of such a record is not mandatorily negotiable.4 This 
aspect of the charge is, therefore, dismissed. 
Fnd-of-the-Year Checks 
Before the NURHS system was implemented, the County produced a split 
payroll for the pay period which spanned the end of December and the beginning of 
January.5 The check issued for the last days worked in December was referred to as 
the end-of-the-year check. After the implementation of the NURHS system, the County 
did not issue an end-of-the-year check. Instead, one paycheck was issued in January 
for the days of the pay period that fell in December and for the days that fell in January. 
CSEA alleges that this change eliminated one paycheck for each unit employee, the 
end-of-the-year check, and resulted in all unit employees waiting more time to be paid 
for time worked in December. In addition, some employees who had reached the limit 
on social security tax deductions for the year ending in December, and would not have 
had social security tax withheld from their end-of-the-year checks for the days worked in 
December, had social security taxes taken out of the January paycheck for the entire 
pay period. The ALJ determined that the elimination of the end-of-the-year check was 
merely a change in format and processing of information that did not significantly impact 
4Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist.. 20 PERB P053 (1987). 
5Most County employees received a salary increase, due to raises or increments, 
at the beginning of the fiscal year on January 1. The old payroll system was unable to 
calculate one paycheck based on two rates of pay so the County issued a year-end 
paycheck to pay each unit employee for time worked up to the end of the year, at the 
old rate of pay. The first paycheck in January was for the days worked during that pay 
period at the new rate of pay. 
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on terms and conditions of employment. We affirm the ALJ's dismissal of this allegation 
on different grounds. 
As we noted with respect to the overtime checks issued as part of the 
supplemental payroll, the County's established practice is to issue paychecks to unit 
employees every two weeks. The County was compelled to issue an end-of-the-year 
check because it could not issue a paycheck based upon two different rates of pay. 
When NURHS technology eliminated that inability, the condition giving rise to the end-
of-the-year paycheck no longer existed. For the same reasons that there is no violation 
in the County's including overtime payments in the regular paychecks, we find no 
violation as to the elimination of the end-of-the-year checks. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
,hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ MarcX Abbott, .^Memb er 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, ILA, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4573 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 342, United Marine 
Division, ILA, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the units agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4573 
- 2 -
Unit 1: Included: All employees in the Civil Service titles of 
Lifeguard and Senior Lifeguard 
Excluded: Chief Lifeguard and Assistant Chief Lifeguard 
Unit 2: Included: All employees in the Civil Service titles of 
Beach Manager and Senior Beach Manager 
Excluded: Chief Lifeguard and- Assistant Chief Lifeguard 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 342, United Marine 
Division, ILA, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect .to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WALLKILL POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4768 
TOWN OF WALLKILL, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Wallkill Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4768 
- 2 
Unit: Included: Full and part time police officers and 
sergeants. 
Excluded: All other employees 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Wallkill Police 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: August 17, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
